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Autonomy of Nations and Indigenous Peoples
and the Environmental Release of Genetically
Engineered Animals with Gene Drives
University of Rhode, Kingston, USA

Abstract
This article contends that the environmental release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with heritable traits that are
patented will present a challenge to the efforts of nations and indigenous peoples to engage in self-determination. The environmental release of such animals has been proposed on the grounds that they could function as public health tools or as
solutions to the problem of agricultural insect pests. This article brings into focus two political-economic-legal problems that
would arise with the environmental release of such organisms. To address those challenges, it is proposed that nations considering the environmental release of GE animals must take into account the underlying circumstances and policy failures that
motivate arguments for the use of the modiﬁed animals. Moreover, countries must recognize that the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights place on them
an obligation to ensure that GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released without the substantive consent of
the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected.

Policy Implications

•
•
•
•

Nations considering the environmental release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with patented heritable traits must
take into account the underlying circumstances and policy failures that motivate arguments for the use of the modiﬁed
organisms.
Countries must recognize that as parties to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), they have
an obligation to not permit the environmental release of GE animals with patented heritable traits without the substantive
consent of the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected.
Countries must acknowledge that the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) places a
duty on them to ensure that GE animals with heritable traits that are patented are only released in the wild with the free,
informed consent of the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected.
Countries must ensure that the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporate entities and other organizations over
whom they have authority respect the right of indigenous peoples and other nations to make informed, free decisions
about the presence of GE animals with patented heritable traits in their territories.

Environmental release of genetically engineered
animals with gene drives: international treaties
and patents
The ability of nations1 and indigenous peoples to act autonomously is invariably constrained by various state and nonstate actors. This article argues that the environmental
release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with patented
heritable traits will present an additional challenge to the
efforts of nations and indigenous peoples to engage in selfdetermination.
Proponents of GE animals (speciﬁcally, GE insects) with
patented heritable traits have proposed releasing them in
the environment arguing that they could serve as public
health measures or as solutions to the problem of agricultural insect ‘pests’2 (see, for instance, Godfray et al., 2017).
Germline cells or early embryos would be altered by means

Global Policy (2019) doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12699

of genetic modiﬁcation,3 with the change affecting the progeny of the engineered organism at a percentage higher
than the one described by Mendel’s law of inheritance; such
a modiﬁcation is referred to as a ‘gene drive’ (see Burt,
2003; Champer et al., 2016; Harvey-Samuel et al., 2017;
Hammond and Galizi, 2017).
The possible threat to biodiversity from the open release
of such modiﬁed animals has received attention (CourtierOrgogozo et al., 2017). This article brings into focus two
complex political-economic-legal problems that would arise
with the environmental release of GE animals (including GE
insects) with heritable traits that are patented. First, if those
modiﬁed organisms encroach on the territories of peoples
and countries that have not consented to their presence on
their lands or waterways, their political right of self-determination will have been violated by the parties responsible for
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the environmental release of the animals. Second, if a
patented heritable trait spreads through future generation
of the wildtype of the species in those territories, it would
constitute a de facto privatization of a commons of those
nations and indigenous peoples.4
Drawing on multiple disciplines, this article advances the
discussion about the signiﬁcance of the open release of GE
animals with gene drives. In particular, the legal scholarship
on the unintended genetic drift of GE seed is used to develop
an analysis of the political and ethical signiﬁcance of the
encroachment of GE animals with gene drives on the territories of nations and indigenous peoples. The analysis breaks
new ground in four respects. First, by invoking the United
Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it is argued that
the environmental release of GE animals with gene drives
could pose a threat to the political rights of indigenous peoples and nations unless their right to make informed, free
decisions about the presence of those animals in their
lands and waters is respected by the nation responsible for
the release. Second and relatedly, the case is made that
nations whose regulatory agencies authorize the environmental release of GE animals with gene drives have an ethical and
legal obligation to ensure that those animals do not encroach
on the territories of indigenous peoples and nations that have
not consented to their presence on their lands or waters. The
releasing nation’s duty is not obviated even if individual
researchers, corporations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) or other proponents of the biotechnology manage to
persuade particular indigenous peoples or nations to agree to
the release in their territories. Third, using philosopher Onora
O’Neill’s account of non-state actors as (secondary) agents of
justice, it is argued that NGOs, corporations, and other organizations (such as public-private partnerships) can be agents of
injustice if they fail to respect the right of indigenous peoples
and nations to make free, informed decisions about matters
that affect them. And fourth, it is demonstrated that the
notion of free, informed consent that O’Neill developed (using Kant’s ethical theory and which is used at the level of individuals) can be used meaningfully for social groups and
associations, in this case, indigenous peoples and nations,
respectively. Thus, this article advances the discussion about
the ethico-political salience of the release of such animals.
The following policy guidelines are proposed for the globally relevant risks and collective action problems posed by
the environmental release of GE animals with heritable
patented traits:

•
•

Nations considering the environmental release of GE animals with patented heritable traits must take into account
the underlying circumstances and policy failures that motivate arguments for the use of the modiﬁed organisms.
Countries must recognize that as parties to the UN ICCPR
and the UN ICESCR, they have an obligation to ensure that
GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released
in the environment without the substantive consent of the
nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected.
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•

Nations must ensure that the NGOs, corporations, and
other organizations based in their jurisdiction respect the
right of indigenous peoples and other nations to make
informed, free decisions about the presence of GE animals with patented heritable traits in their territories.

GE animals (including insects) with patented heritable
traits: how, why, and ecosystem concerns
Researchers and biotechnology companies have been using
techniques of modern biotechnology to modify animals,
with the introduced trait or change passed on to some percentage of the animal’s progeny (Moura et al. 2018). As a
rule, those animals and their progeny are kept in contained
facilities. A variety of strains of engineered mice are routinely used in medical research; the animals are kept in laboratories. GE goats, GE chicken and GE rabbits developed
for the purposes of manufacturing pharmaceuticals are
housed in secure farms (see, for instance, Svoboda, ). A GE
salmon has been approved for use as food in Canada and
the US; the ‘manufacturer’ intends to raise them in contained facilities to prevent their encroachment on the wild
(Gonzales, 2018). GE pigs that are resistant to a viral infection that tends to occur in industrial livestock farms are
under development (Burkard et al., 2018), presumably, they
would be raised on farms for use as food.
So while the creation of animals with germline modiﬁcation is not a new phenomenon, what is different now is the
push to deliberately release in the environment animals with
patented modiﬁed traits that are passed on at a rate higher
than the one described by Mendel’s law. Key advocates of
gene drives have proposed affecting the genetic modiﬁcation by means of recently developed gene editing techniques (see, for instance, Molteni, 2018).5 Gene editing
enables more precise engineering of the genome than other
techniques of genetic modiﬁcation. (Gene editing can be
performed on somatic cells or germline cells (including very
early embryos).) CRISPR is cheaper and easier to use than
other gene editing methods.
For the purposes of public health or as an agricultural pest
control measure, two types of gene drives are under consideration for insects, speciﬁcally, population replacement gene
drive and population suppression gene drive (James, 2005;
Marshall and Akbari, 2016).6 Population replacement gene
drives would change (or eliminate) traits of the modiﬁed
insect and its progeny, say, for instance, their ability to transmit pathogens. If GE insects with a population replacement
gene drive are released in the wild, and if they successfully
mated with their wildtype, then the introduced trait would
occur in the resulting progeny, and over multiple generations
spread throughout the wildtype population.
In contrast, a population suppression gene drive, for
instance would affect a modiﬁcation that undermines the
survival ability or the fertility of the engineered animal and
its progeny. GE mosquitoes with a population suppression
gene drive have been proposed as a public health tool for
mosquito-borne diseases (see, for instance, Alphey, 2016;

Global Policy (2019)

GE Animals, Treaties, and Patents

Burt and Crisanti, 2018). If GE mosquitoes with population
suppression gene drives are released in ‘sufﬁcient numbers’,7
and they successfully mate with their wildtype counterpart,
then, presumably, over time the wildtype population of that
mosquito strain would be reduced and possibly eliminated.
Thereby obviating the need for pesticide use. Rendering
chemical pesticide use unnecessary is presented as a key
justiﬁcation for the use of GE insects for the purposes of
public health or to address the problem of agricultural
insect pests. (This article does not engage with the arguments for the use of GE animals with patented gene drives
as the solution to the problem of invasive species, but some
of the concerns discussed here are of relevance for that case
too).
Ecosystem concerns
The Convention on Biological Diversity, a key multilateral
environmental treaty, conceptualizes ecosystems as ‘dynamic complex(es) of plant, animal and micro-organism
communities and their non-living environment interacting
as a functional unit’ (CBD (undated)). If GE animals with
gene drives that belong to a species that is highly mobile,
reproduces sexually, very fertile, and has a relatively short
generation time, and if ‘sufﬁcient numbers’ of such modiﬁed
animals are released in the environment and they mate successfully with their wildtype counterpart, then their impact
could be felt in multiple ecosystems around the globe. A
concern with the environmental release of GE animals with
gene drives is the possibility of horizontal gene transfer
(HGT).8 The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine (NASEM) (2016) report on gene drives noted
that HGT among plants is more likely than between other
species (because closely related, but separate, plant species
tend to hybridize), but it recommended that ‘the possibility
of the horizontal exchange of gene drives between species
should be evaluated prior to environmental release’ (p. 40).
There are also worries about off-target effects (i.e. unintended genetic change) and the possibility of the target
species evolving resistance to the trait introduced by the
gene drive (Ogaugwu et al., 2019).
In any ecosystem, a change in all members of a species
(or even a substantial percentage of the species)9 could
have implications for other species because the biotic elements of ecosystems shape in varying degrees multiple
aspects of each other’s existence. The existence of species is
directly or indirectly entwined in different ways (ranging
from mutual dependency to competition to predation) and
to different degrees (Rose, 2010; van Dooren, 2018) . So, if
animals with a population replacement gene drive are
released in the environment such that a substantial percentage or all of the future generations of the wildtype population inherit the patented engineered trait, then depending
on the trait and given the relationship between that species
and other species, there could be a ripple effect in the
ecosystem. For instance, if a particular species (because of
the modiﬁcation) is no longer available in sufﬁcient numbers
as a primary source of food for other species, then those
species may adapt or die out, thereby possibly affecting yet
Global Policy (2019)
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other species that are dependent on them. The uncertainty
about the possible consequences of the environmental
release of GE animals with gene drives would remain after
successful ﬁeld trials and even environmental releases in
particular ecosystems because of the variability between
ecosystems.
The environmental release of GE animals with population
suppression gene drives may have profound consequences
too given the interconnected existence of species. If the
population of the species that is the target of the population suppression gene drive collapses or even signiﬁcantly
reduces, then depending on the nature of that species’ relationship with other species in the ecosystem, the impact
could be signiﬁcant.
The introduction of GE animals with germline modiﬁcation (that occurs at a rate greater than the one described by
Mendel’s law) could have substantial implications for any
country whose ecosystems are affected; the ramiﬁcations
are likely to be ampliﬁed for indigenous peoples and global
South nations. The land inhabited by indigenous peoples,
while only 20 per cent of the globe and spread across 90
countries, is crucial for preserving biodiversity, adaptation to
climate change, and management of ecosystems (G€
umplova,
2018). Seventeen countries have the greatest biodiversity on
the planet (Mittermeier et al., 1997); those global South
nations are in the Andean region, the Amazon basin, and in
South Asia (Janni, 2004). Given that the greatest biodiversity
of the planet is concentrated in the ecosystems of the global South, including the territories of indigenous peoples, it
is likely that they would disproportionately experience the
immediate and direct impact of changes caused by the
introduction of GE animals with patented heritable
traits that exceed the Mendelian rate of inheritance.
There could also be political-economic-legal problems
occasioned by the environmental release of GE animals with
gene drives. Part 1 argues that if the environmental release
of such animals results in them encroaching on the territories of indigenous peoples and nations that have not consented to their presence in their land or waters, then their
political right to self-determination will have been violated
by the parties responsible for the release. Part 2 contends
that the open release of such organisms could, in effect,
constitute the de facto privatization of the species to which
those animals belong, in violation of the claim that countries
and indigenous peoples have with respect to that species
(qua commons) in their territories. Part 3 considers the question whether concerns about the threat to the political
autonomy and sovereign rights of nations and indigenous
peoples from the environmental release of GE animals with
gene drives should be privileged over public health and
agricultural insect pest problems.

Part 1: violation of the political right to selfdetermination
GE insects with gene drives are among the most likely candidates for environmental release, so this article uses them
as examples to expose the complexities and complications
© 2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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of the open release of GE animals with gene drives. GE mosquitoes with a (CRISPR-based) population suppression gene
drive are under development. Those mosquitoes would be
akin to a GE mosquito with a patented heritable trait that
has been ’manufactured’ by Oxitec Ltd.10
The Oxitec OX513A GE mosquito is meant to have a population suppression effect and it has been modiﬁed to be
dependent on tetracycline for its survival. Virtually all of the
progeny of the engineered mosquitoes have the heritable
trait (speciﬁcally, a synthetic genetic sequence that makes
them dependent on tetracycline for their survival) (US FDA
2016). When the OX513A GE mosquito successfully mates
with its wildtype counterpart, the majority of the offspring do
not survive to adulthood in environments where tetracycline
is not available in sufﬁcient quantities (US FDA 2016). The
Oxitec OX513A GE mosquito does not have a CRISPR-based
gene drive. Since 2009, the Oxitec OX513A GE Aedes aegypti
mosquito has been ﬁeld trialed or used in the Brazil, the Cayman Islands, Malaysia and Panama for the purposes of reducing the wildtype Aedes aegypti population, with the goal of
decreasing the transmission of pathogens from infected
female mosquitoes to humans (de Campos et al., 2017).
Whether that OX513A GE mosquito has reduced the transmission of infection in humans remains an open question; there
is a dearth of peer reviewed, published studies on the matter
(see also de Campos et al., 2017 on the subject).
Some proponents of gene drives advocate releasing in the
environment GE mosquitoes with (CRISPR-based) population
suppression gene drives (Molteni, 2018). If they successfully
mate with their wildtype population, the assumption is that
over time it will lead to signiﬁcant reduction in their wildtype
counterpart population, presumably, resulting in lower incidence of mosquito-borne diseases in humans.
GE insects with (CRISPR-based) population suppression
gene drives have also been proposed as a solution to the
problem of agricultural insect pests (Godfray et al., 2017).
The aim would be to undermine the survival ability of the
engineered insect and its progeny. The plan is to release in
the environment GE insects with population suppression
gene drives and if they successfully mate with their wildtype
counterpart that are considered agricultural insect pests, the
progeny would not survive and consequently the wildtype
population of that insect, presumably, would decrease over
time. (Oxitec has developed GE Diamondback moths, GE fall
army worms, GE spotted-wing drosophila, and GE med ﬂy
that will have a population suppression effect on their wildtype counterparts that are considered agricultural insect
pests (Oxitec 2002–2018); as of January 2019, presumably,
the Oxitec GE insects do not have a CRISPR-based gene
drive).
Below, it is argued that if GE insects with patented heritable traits enter the territories of nations or indigenous peoples who have not consented to their presence, their
autonomy would have been violated by the nation(s)
responsible for the release. Speciﬁcally, their claim to their
natural resources would be undermined.

© 2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Violation of the autonomy of nations
To get a grasp on the threat that the environmental
release of GE animals (including insects) represents to the
political right to self-determination of nations, it is useful
to consider the analogous case of genetic drift of genetically modiﬁed (GM) seed (i.e., the adventitious presence of
GM seed in nations that have not permitted their use
within their borders). The inadvertent presence of GE seed
on lands where they are not licensed for use is a serious
matter that continues to be the subject of legal scholarship
(see, for instance, Aoki, 2009; Bernhardt, 2005; Blakeney,
2016; Cole et al., 2014; Delaney, 2007; Glascoe, 2017;
Haugo, 2014; Kariyawasam, 2010; Kool, 2010; Lynd, 2013;
Ma, 2012; Mgbeoji, 2007; Peck, 2008; Schlessinger and Endres, 2015).
While a number of scholars have focused on the signiﬁcance of genetic drift of GM seed for US farmers, Peck
(2008) has examined at length its international implications.
This article extends Peck’s analysis to GE animals with germline modiﬁcation that is inherited at a rate higher than the
one described by Mendel’s law. Moreover, while Peck considers the problem occasioned when a country uses GE seed
without taking measures to ensure that the autonomy of
other nations is not violated, this article argues that the
nation responsible for the release of GE animals with gene
drives has an obligation to make sure that the autonomy of
indigenous groups that could be affected is not undermined
either.
Analyzing cross-border GM seed contamination, Peck has
argued that if a nation (that is pro-GM seed) does not institute regulatory measures that ensure that its use of GM
seed with patented heritable traits will not result in the contamination of the ecosystems or food supply of countries
that do not welcome the presence of genetically modiﬁed
organisms (GMOs), it violates their political right of self-determination. That infraction qualiﬁes as a form of political
harm, even if the GMO presence is nominal (Peck, 2008). To
make her argument, Peck invokes two UN treaties – the
ICCPR and the ICESCR.
The UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is a multilateral treaty that was
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and came
into force in 1976. States that are party to it have a duty to
grant economic, social, and cultural rights to former colonies.11 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is another multilateral treaty of the UN General Assembly that was also adopted in 1966 and came into
effect in 1976. The treaty obligates states that have ratiﬁed
it to respect a number of rights of colonized peoples as well
as nations.
The language of Article One of the ICESCR and the ICCPR
is identical. Article One of the two treaties guarantee the
right to self-determination to peoples (in the wake of WWII,
the term ‘peoples’ was re-deﬁned to refer to deﬁned territorial regions that were former colonies and comprised of ethnically diverse populations).12
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According to Article 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right, they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to
any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual beneﬁt,
and international law. In no case, may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including
those having responsibility for the administration of NonSelf-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Invoking the ICESCR and the ICCPR, Peck (2008) has
argued that when a nation that uses GM seed does not
ensure that the modiﬁed seed with heritable traits do
not enter the territories of nations that are opposed to
them, it violates their political right to self-determination.
When non-state actors, such as corporations, use (or allow
the use of) GM seed but fail to ascertain that the modiﬁed
seed do not encroach on the territories of nations that do
not want their presence, then the state that enabled the
release is responsible for the violation of the political right to
self-determination of the affected countries. The unstated
premise of Peck’s argument is that an agent (in this case, a
state) is culpable if the harm potential (i.e. risk) could have
been reasonably foreseen and if the agent had the authority
to prevent the harm but chose not to. Peck (2008) contends
that the introduction of GM seed in Brazil by Syngenta (in
violation of that country’s law), for instance, is ultimately
traceable to the US’ pro GMOs stance:
The sum total of U.S policies regarding GMOs–including initial regulatory assumptions, reaction to
the precautionary principle in international agreements, failure to ratify the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), and domestic labeling policy –
results in a reality in which the adventitious presence of GMOs is inevitable in the food and seed
stocks in the United States, and increasingly in
other countries that do not produce GMOs in large
quantities, and in some cases do not desire them
. . . Because of the fact of adventitious presence,
that policy decision is being quietly spread to other
countries where the people, through their respective political processes, have determined that GMOs
are unwelcome, or in which the issue has yet to be
settled (pp. 56–57).
Peck (2008, p. 57) elaborates on her point by noting that
‘[b]y introducing unwanted GM products into the food supply of nations that have not yet had the opportunity to
arrive at political solutions for dealing with those products,
U.S. GMO policy creates the same effect as the intrusions by
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foreign sovereigns that motivated the international recognition of the right to self-determination’.
Peck’s argument has relevance for a key concern of this
article, that is, the political signiﬁcance of the environmental
release of GE animals with gene drives. Nations have the
authority to regulate the activities of research entities, commercial enterprises, NGOs, and other organizations within
their borders and determine the conditions under which
they provide or sell their products or technical know-how to
those beyond their borders. So, when a nation chooses to
not institute regulatory policies that would ensure that the
organizations within its borders do not act in ways such that
it results in GE animals with gene drives encroaching on the
territories of countries that have not authorized their presence, it violates their political right to self-determination that
is guaranteed in the ICESCR and the ICCPR.13
It is also worth considering that even if a nation may have
technically permitted the presence of the modiﬁed animals
(say, GE insects) in its territories, it would not constitute substantive consent if it was coerced, manipulated or deceived
by the parties advocating the release of the GE animals.14
The parties in question could be, for instance, NGOs, commercial entities, or other organizations (such as public-private partnerships). The notion that non-state actors, such as
NGOs and corporations, can be agents of injustice is based
on O’Neill’s work (2001, 2004). She argues that those nonstate actors can function as (secondary) agents of justice
insofar as they have the capacity to ensure that the rights
of individuals are respected. Conversely, they can be agents
of injustice. The following are some of the ways in which a
nation could be deprived of the opportunity to make a free,
informed decision and thus exercise its agency by the sellers
of GE animals or organizations who are their proponents:
1. The proponents (or sellers) of a modiﬁed insect meant
for agricultural pest control purposes withhold or misrepresent research data (about, say, the efﬁcacy of the GE
insect as an agricultural pest control measure or the
uncertainties about it ecological impact) from the target
nation’s regulatory agencies and publics.
2. The proponents (or sellers) of a modiﬁed insect intended
to serve as a public health tool present the GE organism
to regulatory agencies and the publics as posing no
human health risks even though there is uncertainty
about the possibility of harm.
3. The proponents (or sellers) of a modiﬁed insect act in
ways that deter or prevent that country’s regulatory
agencies or public health authorities from attending to
their ﬁduciary responsibility to the public (for instance,
by providing ‘incentives’ to public ofﬁcials or using other
means to manipulate them).
4. Without disclosing their speciﬁc normative commitments
or relevant organizational afﬁliations, the proponents (or
sellers) of a modiﬁed insect attempt to inﬂuence efforts
to create regulations that would apply to the GE insect,
thereby, possibly undermining the likelihood of the creation of new regulatory schemas that would enable its
tailored and rigorous oversight (see, for instance, the
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complaint letter from the African Centre for Biodiversity
et al., 2015 to Dr. Cristiana Pasßca Palmer Executive Secretary Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity).
This is not an exhaustive list. These kinds of violations
constitute unethical actions and depending on the laws of
the affected nation, there could be legal ramiﬁcations for
the wrongdoers.
The release of GE animals that could pose a threat to the
autonomy of indigenous peoples is considered in the next
section. To provide a context for that analysis, the notion of
self-government of indigenous peoples is juxta-positioned
against the conception of autonomy of nations.

Violation of the autonomy of indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples
There are approximately 370 million indigenous persons,
who belong to 5,000 different groups, in 90 countries worldwide (UN, Sustainable development . . .). The UN notes that
‘Indigenous Peoples are found in every region of the world,
but about 70% of them live in Asia . . . Examples of Indigenous Peoples include the Inuit of the Arctic, Native Americans, hunter-gatherers in the Amazon, traditional pastoralists
like the Maasai in East Africa, and tribal peoples in the
Philippines. While there is no universally accepted deﬁnition
for ‘Indigenous Peoples,’ there tend to be common characteristics among them, including:

•
•
•
•
•
•

They often have small populations relative to the dominant culture of their country;
They usually have (or had) their own language;
They practice distinctive cultural traditions;
They have (or had) their own land and territory, to which
they are connected to at
various levels;
They self-identify as Indigenous’ (UN (undated)).

The above list is not meant to be a set of necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions that categorically determines
which groups qualify as indigenous peoples and which
ones do not. Attempts to create criteria for the category
of ‘indigenous peoples’ must be understood in context.
Bello-Bravo (2019) notes that when the question, ‘what is
indigeneity?’, is asked, then the question ‘when is indigeneity?’ must also be asked. She contends that the latter
question exposes the former question as an act of hegemonic state power to place constraints on, justify exclusion
of, or appropriate the natural resources of particular
indigenous peoples.
Autonomy of indigenous peoples
The encroachment of modiﬁed animals with heritable
patented traits in the territories of indigenous peoples, without them having the opportunity to make free, informed
decisions about the presence of those organisms in their
lands or waters, qualiﬁes as a violation of their political right
to engage in self-determination. The UN recognizes that
they have that right.
© 2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Erica Irene Daes, the founding Chairperson and Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, successfully argued that indigenous peoples qualiﬁed as a colonized peoples. Given that the political
right to self-determination as well as the sovereign right of
colonized peoples over their natural resources was recognized by various international treaties, Daes contended that
the same rights should be extended to indigenous peoples
under those agreements. She argues,
a. Indigenous peoples are colonized peoples in the economic, political and historical sense;
b. Indigenous peoples suffer from unfair and unequal economic arrangements typically suffered by other colonized peoples;
c. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources is necessary to level the economic and political playing ﬁeld and to provide protection against unfair
and oppressive arrangements;
d. Indigenous peoples have a right to development and
actively to participate in the realization of this right;
sovereignty over their natural resources is an essential
prerequisite for this; and
e. The natural resources original belonged to the Indigenous peoples concerned and were not, in most situations, freely and fairly given up (Daes, 2004, p.11).

This article construes self-determination of indigenous
peoples to mean collective self-determination of particular
indigenous peoples grounded in their right as peoples (that
precedes and supersedes their recognition by colonial (or
neocolonial) states) to make decisions on the basis of ‘their
own decision-making process undertaken with sufﬁcient
time and in accordance with their cultural traditions, customs and practices’ (UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples et al., 2016).15
Drawing on Corntassel (2003), Bello-Bravo (2019, p. 2) clariﬁes that while indigenous groups have argued for their
claim to autonomy (self-government), they have not insisted
on ‘independent statehood, which per se can be disambiguated from self-government’. Alfred and Ahern (1995, p.
14 cited in Coulthard, 2014, p. 64) write that when most
indigenous peoples make a claim to nationhood, they are
not desirous of creating a new state, rather they seek recognition and autonomy ‘through the achievement of a cultural
sovereignty and a political relationship based on group
autonomy reﬂected in formal self government arrangements’. Bello-Bravo (2019, p. 2) notes that ‘nation-states
have remained either skeptical about, or have simply used
. . . (the) legal question (of self-government) as a pretext for
avoiding the consequences of fully recognizing the rights of
indigenous people to land, resources, genetic property, selfdetermination, and self-rule’.
That notion of self-deﬁnition (of indigenous peoples)
stands in contrast to autonomy as usually conceptualized by
nations. For instance, a nation committed to neoliberalism is
likely to understand its right to self-determination over its
territories to be virtually categorical. It would be averse to
the idea that is central to many indigenous people’s notion
of self-determination, speciﬁcally, collectively ownership and
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management of natural resources shaped and constrained
by a commitment to non-domination and non-exploitation.
A neoliberal state might not regard governance based on
those values as governance; it would consider such territories as terra nullis, that is, ungoverned territories that should
be appropriated and privatized so that they can be made
‘productive’.
Threats to the autonomy of indigenous peoples: state
actors and other organizations (including non-state actors
and public-private collaboratives)
Nations whose regulatory agencies authorize the release of
GE animals with gene drives have an ethical obligation to
take into account the relationships of domination, marginalization, and exploitation between nations and the indigenous peoples within those countries’ borders. Ensuring that
indigenous peoples that could be affected by the release of
GE animals with gene drives are not deprived of their right
to make free, informed decisions about the presence of GE
animals in their territories will mean at least two things.
Suppose that a research organization based in the UK has
developed GE insects with gene drives and is planning to
release them in Brazil with that nation’s permission. Given
that the research organization is located in the UK and
given that the UK has authority over entities within its borders, then in light of Peck’s analysis of the Syngenta case,
the UK is in effect the state responsible for the release (as is
Brazil). As the nation responsible for the release, the UK
must not assume that it has to acquire the free, (prior)
informed consent of only the indigenous peoples that could
be affected and who are recognized by Brazil.16 The UK’s
ethical responsibility would extend to indigenous peoples
who could be affected by the release even if those peoples
are refused recognition by Brazil. Second, the UK, as the
state responsible for the release, should not assume that it
has to respect only the particular set of rights that Brazil
affords to the indigenous peoples within its borders.17
Otherwise, the UK will have failed ethically and become
complicit in the oppression of indigenous peoples in Brazil
who are denied their claim over their territories by Brazil.
This obligation is also reﬂexive. For instance, if Canada were
considering the release of GE animals with gene drives
within its borders, then it would have a moral obligation to
respect the right to self-determination of the indigenous
peoples whose territories are within its borders and who
could be affected by its decision to release those modiﬁed
animals. Nations that are guilty of colonial dispossession of
indigenous peoples’ rights and territories may resist
acknowledging that two-fold responsibility. It will mean that
they will have to make amends for their past and on-going
wrong doings to the previously self-determining peoples
upon which the colonialist state’s ‘territorial, economic, and
social infrastructure is constituted’ (Coulthard, 2014, p. 40).
Nations considering releasing GE animals with gene drives
also should not uncritically accept the conception of indigenous peoples’ free, informed decision-making proposed by
organizations that represent the dominant interests. Some
entities have a history of attempting to undermine the
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autonomy of indigenous groups (see, for instance, BelloBravo, 2019 and Corntassel, 2003 on this subject). Consider
that in the wake of the 2016 High Level Dialogue on the
Proposed Environmental and Social Standard 7 on Indigenous Peoples (that was held in Addis Ababa), the World
Bank released (on its website) a summary of the discussion
that stated that government representatives, the current
and former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the representative of the African Commission on Human and People Rights expressed their ‘broad
acceptance’ of the proposal that the Free Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples should be
operationally deﬁned as ‘broad community support’ (BCS)
(World Bank 2016, p. 1).
In response to that World Bank’s claim, on 20 May 2016,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (along with the Chairperson of the Expert Mechanism
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Chairperson of
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues) sent a letter
to the President of the World Bank, Jim Young Kim, and the
Bank’s executive directors. The letter criticized the Bank’s
attempt to undermine the autonomy of indigenous peoples
by falsely asserting that there was an agreement that the
notion of free, prior informed consent should be operationalized as ‘broad community support’. The letter also
noted that
Broad community support’ (BCS) is an ambiguous
concept with no legal basis under international law
and without a clear understanding or meaning. The
World Bank’s own internal review on the implementation of its existing policy on Indigenous peoples
points to the fact that ‘broad community support’
has not been ascertained in a consistent manner and
has failed to ensure good faith consultation leading
to outcomes and agreements with Indigenous peoples that guarantee respect for their rights. BCS has
been applied in projects that manifestly lacked the
substantive elements of FPIC and has consequently
served to weaken the respect for the collective decisions of Indigenous peoples based on their own
decision-making institutions and processes . . . We
would like to reiterate that the right to give or withhold FPIC is a collective self-determination based
right of Indigenous peoples as peoples. Consent
must therefore be obtained through Indigenous
peoples’ own decision-making process undertaken
with sufﬁcient time and in accordance with their cultural traditions, customs and practices (UN Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
et al., 2016).
This paper contends that the nation responsible for the
release of GE animals with gene drives must respect the
right of indigenous peoples to make a free, informed decision (using their own decision-making process with sufﬁcient time and in accordance with their cultural traditions,
customs and practices) about those organisms’ presence in
© 2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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their territories. It is not obvious whether the 2018 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
recognized that right of indigenous peoples (the Conference
of the Parties is the governing body of the Convention, and
it advances implementation of the multilateral environmental treaty by means of the decisions made at its meetings
(CBD (undated)). Articles 9(c) and 11 of the draft decision
(on synthetic biology) submitted by the Chair of Working
Group II of the November 2018 Conference of the Parties to
the Convention seems to water down the right of indigenous peoples over their territories on the matter of the environmental release of GE animals with gene drives.
Articles 9-11 of the ‘Synthetic Biology: Draft decision (on
GE animals with gene drives) submitted by the Chair of
Working Group II’ are as follows:
[Article] 9. Calls upon Parties and other Governments, taking into account the current uncertainties
regarding engineered gene drives, to apply a precautionary approach in accordance with the objectives
of the Convention, and also calls upon Parties and
other Governments to only consider introducing
organisms containing engineered gene drives into
the environment, including for experimental releases
and research and development purposes, when:
9a. Scientiﬁcally sound case-by-case risk assessments have been carried out;18
9b. Risk management measures are in place to
avoid or minimize potential adverse effects, as
appropriate;
9c. Where appropriate, the "prior and informed consent", the "free, prior and informed consent" or "approval and involvement" of potentially affected
indigenous peoples and local communities is
sought or obtained, where applicable in accordance with national circumstances and legislation;

[Article] 10. Recognizes that, as there could be
potential adverse effects arising from organisms
containing engineered gene drives, before these
organisms are considered for release into the environment, research and analysis are needed, and
speciﬁc guidance may be useful, to support caseby-case risk assessment;
[Article] 11. Notes the conclusions of the Ad Hoc
Technical Expert Group on Synthetic Biology that,
given the current uncertainties regarding engineered gene drives, the free, prior and informed
consent of indigenous peoples and local communities might be warranted when considering the possible release of organisms containing engineered
gene drives that may impact their traditional
knowledge, innovation, practices, livelihood and
use of land and water (my italics).
Insofar as Article 9(c) of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention’s draft statement (on synthetic biology) equates
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‘free, informed consent’ of indigenous peoples with their
‘approval and involvement’ in the release of GE animals with
gene drives (the latter is a looser, more ambiguous standard), it is at odds with the stance on free, informed consent of indigenous peoples expressed in the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (especially Articles 19
and 32) and the 20 May 20 2016, letter sent by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the
President of the World Bank and Bank’s executive directors
(the letter was discussed above). Moreover, Article 11 (echoing the stance of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on
Synthetic Biology) seems to not recognize that nations have
an obligation to respect the right of indigenous peoples to
make free, informed decisions about the presence of GE animals with gene drives in their territories. By asserting that
nations ‘might’ seek the free, informed consent of indigenous peoples rather than stating they ‘should’, Working
Group II (of the 2018 Conference of Parties to the Convention) appears to assume that on the matter of the environmental release of GE animals with gene drives nations may
choose whether or not to respect the claim of indigenous
peoples over their territories.

Part 2: de facto privatization of the commons of
indigenous peoples and nations
Scope of patents of GE animals and insects
The environmental release of GE animals with patented
population replacement gene drives could constitute the de
facto privatization of the wildtype of that species (as well as
the hybrids that may inherit the trait). While individual
nations have the right to decide (on the basis of their
national interests) whether to issue patents for germline
traits or modiﬁed organisms, their choices are constrained
by international trade agreements as well as inequitable
power relations between nations. The UN is committed to
the sovereign equality of all nations but in reality some
nations (i.e. those with political capital and wealth) are more
than the equals of others on the international stage (Hoffman, 2012). It would be naive to assume that the more
powerful nations would not throw their weight behind particular corporate or industry interests that they believe align
with their national interests as companies attempted to
secure patent rights in various nations for their ‘products’
(see, for instance, Drahos, 1995 on the role of US pharmaceutical companies in crafting the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)).
Nations permit patent claimants to draw a distinction
between the genetic modiﬁcation and the entity (as well as
their progeny) into which it is introduced. But is that distinction substantive or nominal? Aldrich (2015), for instance, has
asked whether it is meaningful to draw a distinction
between the (introduced) genetic sequence and the animal
within which it is introduced given that the former cannot
be separated from the animal. Similarly, Humphries (2015,
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p.2) has questioned the distinction between the introduced
trait and the animal that is modiﬁed on the grounds that
if’a patent law extends protection to all material in which
the product is incorporated, then a broad patent claim over
the gene or gene carrier (vector) of a plant or animal may
have the same outcome as patenting the whole plant or
animal’.
The analysis of Aldrich (2015) and Humphries (2015) has crucial relevance for the issue of the environmental release of
animals with patented heritable traits. As mentioned earlier,
when a nation permits the patenting of a heritable modiﬁcation that surpasses the law of inheritance that is described
by Mendel’s law19 and it does not bar the environmental
release of such animals (and as a result the introduced trait
spreads through the future generations of the wildtype of
that species), then, arguably, in effect, it implicitly authorizes
the privatization of that species.20 After all, the trait is
patented and there is no way to separate the patented
modiﬁcation from the animal.
De facto privatization of commons
Arguments for the use of GE animals with gene drives as
public health or agricultural ‘tools’ are persuasive. However,
it is also useful to recognize that the development of
gene drives is part of the US project that began in the
1980s to ensure the nation’s biotechnology domination in
the face of international competition (Cooper, 2011;
Meghani, 2017). Cooper (2011) has argued that the growth
of the biotechnology sector was fundamentally linked to
US’ neoliberal shift. While her work predates the development of some types of gene drives, her analysis has relevance for it. She contended that biotechnology
development within the neoliberal paradigm aims to dominate life itself (in this case, the species that is targeted for
gene drive modiﬁcation) by re-fashioning it so as to
exploit its ‘work’ (i.e. its life activities) to extract proﬁt from
it. It seems reasonable to suppose that Cooper might
argue that in a certain sense the ambition motivating
research, development and use of GE animals with gene
drives is to control and re-shape species so as to turn
them into revenue streams for the patent-holding entities.21 The re-fashioning of species is intended22 to place
hard limits on what and how they can ‘be’ for the purposes of exercising control over them so as to ﬁnancialize
them (for the patent holder). Given that within the neoliberal paradigm, arguably, the aim of gene drives is to dominate and exploit species for the purposes of proﬁting
from them, indigenous peoples that are committed to having relationships with non-human species that are predicated on non-domination and non-exploitation may have
signiﬁcant reservations about their use.
If the environmental release of modiﬁed animals with
patented heritable traits results in them encroaching on the
territories of nations and indigenous peoples that have not
consented to their presence and if future generations of the
wildtype of that species end up having the modiﬁcation in
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any substantial percentage, it could, in effect, amount to the
conversion of that species into private (bio)property. The privatization of the natural resources of low-income nations
and indigenous peoples without their free, informed consent constitutes wrongdoing for two inter-related political-legal-economic reasons. First, it denies them the right to
beneﬁt from their natural resources. The natural resources
would include the species that is ‘converted’ into a patented
(privately held) bioproperty as well as any other species that
is negatively affected by virtue of its relationship with the
‘converted’ species. Second, the privatization would, in
effect, render indigenous peoples and nations ﬁnancially
beholden to the patent-holding entity for the ‘use’ of its
product. The economic consequences are likely to be particularly pernicious for the poor of low-income nations if the
cost of the ‘use’ of the GE animals adds to the international
debt burden of those countries. Governments usually pay
those debts and the interests on them by cutting public services and goods for the poor and working class (Labont
e
and Schrecker, 2007). The privatization of the commons in
the territories of indigenous peoples would also place a
heavy burden on them. Indigenous peoples are disproportionately poor; they constitute 15 per cent of the world’s
poor and they comprise about a third of the world’s rural
poor (approximately 300 million) even though they are only
an estimated 5 per cent of the Earth’s population (Feiring,
2013).
To understand the implications of the privatization, it is
(again) useful to consider the analogous case of genetic drift
of GM seed (i.e. the migration of GM seed) onto farm ﬁelds
meant for non-GM seed. In such cases, Canadian and US
courts have ruled in favor of the patent holder. In Monsanto
Canada Inc. v Schmeiser, for instance, the Supreme Court
found Percy Schmeiser (a farmer) guilty of infringing Monsanto’s patent right, even though he had not intentionally
planted the GE seed on his farm; the seed had been blown
on to his ﬁelds and had taken root (Wilson, 2014). Wilson
writes, ‘armed with the court-enforced strength of its
patents, Monsanto aggressively seeks out any growers that
may either intentionally or unintentionally infringe upon
those patents’ (2014, p. 176).
In a 2017 article, Glascoe notes that:
[p]atent owner corporations like Monsanto frequently monitor and sue farmers using their
patented crops, including non-GMO farmers who
have fallen victim to their neighbor’s genetic pollution or pollen drift. Between 1997 and 2010, Monsanto ﬁled over 144 lawsuits for alleged patent
infringement or breach of license for its seeds. In
addition to these lawsuits, over 700 infringement
disputes with Monsanto have been settled outside
of court. Monsanto is not the only company that
polices farmland in order to ﬁnd infringers, regardless of intent or fault. The precedent set by these
patent owners and their ruthless enforcement of
their intellectual property rights exposes the nonGMO farmers to additional unwanted liability.
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Pollen drift does not merely hurt the land and crop
value of these farmers; it also creates a cause of
action against them’ (Glascoe, 2017, pp. 541–542).
If the GM seed case is considered by the courts to be the
appropriate legal precedent for cases of genetic drift of GE
animals with patented heritable traits, then countries and
indigenous peoples on whose lands or waters GE animals
with population replacement gene drives encroach would
ﬁnd themselves legally beholden to the patent holder of
the modiﬁed animals (Meghani and Bo€
ete, 2018). The fact
that they had no intention of violating the rights of the
patent holder and did not transport the GE animals to their
territories might not absolve them of legal responsibility.
Moreover, if the GM seed rulings are considered legal
precedent by investor-state dispute settlement systems,
then patent-holding corporations could ﬁle a complaint with
one of those systems against countries with which it does
not have a licensing agreement but on whose lands or
waters its patented ‘products’ have encroached. The Council
on Foreign Relations (2018) has noted that the investor-state
dispute settlement systems ‘typically involve foreign businesses claiming that a host government abused them by
expropriating their assets, discriminating against them, or
otherwise treating them unfairly’. To get a sense of how
investor-state dispute settlement systems might rule, it is
illuminating to consider the case of a Canadian gold mining
company that cited a treaty between Canada and Venezuela
to argue that the latter nation owed it damages because of
its 2011 decision to nationalize the gold industry. According
to the Canadian company, Venezuela violated an investment
treaty between the two nations. The Council notes that ‘[a]
tribunal found that while Venezuela had the legal right to
nationalize private sector industries, it failed to properly
compensate the company for the expropriated assets’
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
In the case of GE animals with patented gene drives, the
patent-holding organization could ask the country that it is
based in to ﬁle a dispute on its behalf against the nation
that has not purchased a license to use its bioproducts, but
in whose territories its patented organisms have
encroached. International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) notes that while only states can bring disputes
before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement system:
powerful corporations and trade associations exert
great inﬂuence directly over the WTO Secretariat
that facilitates the trade dispute settlement process,
as well as through a few dominant governments.
Corporations are also heavily involved in determining which cases States bring to the WTO and lobby
extensively to obtain a favorable outcome
(ICAR 2017).
GE animals with heritable traits that are used as public
health measures (or as agricultural pest control) have the
potential to generate enormous revenue streams for patent
holders. Consider, for instance, the case of the Oxitec
OX513A GE mosquito. That GE mosquito with a germline
© 2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

modiﬁcation (that is inherited at a rate higher than the one
described by Mendel’s law) has been used in Piracicaba, a
Brazilian city with a population of 391,449 as a public health
tool against the diseases transmitted by the Aedes aegypti
mosquito. The 2-year cost of the GE mosquito was priced at
US$1.1 million at the rate of US$10 per person in the target
area (Servick, 2016). The GE mosquito would have to be
periodically re-licensed by the city, adding to its price and
thus revenue for the patent holder. In 2016, the cost of the
use of the GE mosquito was much higher than the price
quoted to Piracicaba. It would be approximately US$1.9 million in the ﬁrst year and US$384,000 every year after that
for a city of 50,000 persons (Alfaro-Murillo et al. 2016). A
full-scale release of the GE OX513A mosquito in the Cayman
Island for the 2018–19 period would cost US$8 million
(Whittaker, 2018). As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of
peer reviewed, published studies on the efﬁcacy of the
OX513A GE mosquito in reducing the incidence of mosquito-borne diseases in humans (see also de Campos et al,
2007). A reduction in the gross number of mosquitoes (either by means of an insecticide or the GE mosquito) may
not necessarily translate into lower rates of infections in
humans because ‘just a few (infected) A. aegypti may be
enough to transmit disease through a susceptible population’ (Servick, 2016). However, the ﬁnancial sector seems to
consider patented GE animal with heritable traits that
exceed the Mendelian rate of inheritance to have signiﬁcant
proﬁt potential. In 2015, Intrexon, a US biotechnology company, purchased Oxitec, a British company, for US$160 million (Nickel and Gillam, 2015).
The use of GE mosquitoes with self-limiting or population
replacement gene drives (that are created with one of the
new genetic editing techniques) may have a price similar to
that of the OX513A GE mosquito. In fact, the price of GE
mosquitoes that have gene edited germline modiﬁcation
might be higher as they might be advertised as the ﬁnal
solution. The larger point here is that patented GE animals
with heritable traits if used for public health or agricultural
purposes could mean signiﬁcant proﬁts for the entities that
hold their patents.

Part 3: much ado about nothing?
Proponents of the environmental release of GE mosquitoes
with gene drives might contend that the worries about the
violation of the political autonomy and sovereign rights of
nations and indigenous peoples over their commons are not
compelling. They might argue that public health concerns,
such as the enormous toll of malaria or other mosquitoborne diseases among the poor of low-income countries,
take precedence over concerns about the violation of the
political right of nations and indigenous peoples to engage
in self-deﬁnition by deciding what enters their borders.
Prima facie, the argument has bite. It requires a response
that takes into account the socio-political-economic context
under which the poor of low and middle-income countries
experience mosquito-borne diseases. The 2015–16 Zika outbreak in Northeastern Brazil was traceable to the interaction
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between a complex of factors. Global warming (a phenomenon that is the product of failure of nations to implement policies ensuring sustainable modes of production) in
the context of Brazil’s humid, tropical climate may have
resulted in the Zika virus reproducing faster than usual in
infected mosquitoes and the mosquitoes maturing faster
than they would otherwise (HRW, 2017). The outbreak’s
impact was felt disproportionately in the poorer communities of the Northeastern states of Pernambuco and Paraıba
that lacked sanitation services, piped water, waste water
treatment facilities, and garbage disposal services (HRW,
2017); there were numerous breeding grounds for mosquitoes in those neighborhoods.
The refusal of the state to respect the sexual and reproductive rights of its populace meant that the Zika virus disproportionately affected young girls and women of
childbearing age who are members of socio-economically
vulnerable, racialized minorities. During the outbreak,
approximately 2,600 children were born with microcephaly
and other complications from the Zika virus (HRW, 2017).
According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch report, ‘more than
75% . . . (of the women and girls who gave birth to those
children) identify as ‘black’ (preta) or ‘brown’ (parda) (as
compared to 59 percent in the general population)’ (HRW,
2017, p. 26). To state the obvious, the outbreak was a function of a complex of socio-political-economic factors in the
context of a failure of democracy wherein some groups
were subject to profound poverty, limited access to medical
and preventative care, and lack of safe housing and other
basic human necessities. A multitude of international and
national policy failures are implicated.
The World Health Organization (WHO) does not consider
it a matter of chance that poorer communities in low-income countries with signiﬁcant incidence of mosquito-borne
diseases experience substantial prevalence of other diseases
of poverty. They are traceable to some of the same structural, systemic factors (WHO 2018a, 2018b; see also Garchitorena et al., 2017; Manderson et al., 2009). Lack of piped
water, garbage disposal services, and waste water treatment
plants as well as insufﬁcient nutrition and medical and preventative care determine the vulnerability of populations to
various diseases. Those structural, systemic factors also affect
their ability to resist the infections and recover from them
(WHO, 2017a). The capacity of populations to avoid or heal
from illness is not always wholly determined by therapeutic
or preventative medical interventions. In a 2013 Lancet article, Burki notes that ‘[m]alaria leaves a person vulnerable to
malnutrition, and malnutrition leaves them vulnerable to
malaria. And of course a person’s nutritional status affects
how they recover from infection; so malnutrition both raises
the risk of contracting a disease such as malaria and worsens its outcome, which in turn leaves the patient enervated,
deprived of nourishment, and vulnerable to infection’ (p.
587). With respect to mosquito-borne diseases, judicious use
of larvicide and insecticide, mosquito population surveillance, treated bed nets, and screened buildings play a critical role in determining the incidence of infections. So,
improving the lives (including health) of vulnerable
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populations in poorer parts of the world means that the
underlying structural, systemic factors must be addressed.
Thus, for dengue, the WHO (2018a) espouses environmental management, chemical control (i.e. larvicide and insecticide), and biological control (i.e. use of native varieties of
ﬁsh in potable water tanks and open freshwater wells). As
part of environmental management, the global health
agency advocates piped water, waste water treatment facilities, screens on windows and doors, and mosquito bed nets
(2018b). In other words, as part of the solution to the high
incidence of mosquito-borne diseases, the UN agency recommends raising living standards in poorer neighborhoods
where multiple diseases of poverty, including mosquitoborne diseases, are endemic. The WHO has unequivocally
stated that it is committed to ‘[a]ddressing the social, economic and environmental determinants of health as a
means to promote health outcomes and reduce health
inequities within and between countries’ (WHO 2017b, p.
27).23
So, the following question must be asked: what kind of
solution is the environmental release of GE mosquitoes with
population suppression or population replacement gene
drives for the problem of the high incidence of mosquitoborne diseases among the poor in tropical and subtropical
regions? Any response to that question must also take into
account that the social determinants of mosquito-borne diseases are also determinants of various other diseases of
poverty endemic in those regions.
Arguably, the use of GE mosquitoes might be taken as
license by nations to avoid making policy changes that
would address the social determinants of the diseases that
disproportionately afﬂict and compromise the poor. Moreover, GE mosquitoes with patented heritable traits represent
a threat to indigenous peoples’ and nations’ political autonomy and sovereign right over their commons and they
might be a signiﬁcant threat to ecosystems.24
The same sort of nuanced and contextualized response is
also warranted for arguments in support of the environmental release of GE insects with gene drives as a key (or the)
solution to the problem of agricultural insect ‘pests’. The
environmental release of GE insects is a solution to a problem created by the practice of industrial agriculture. Agricultural insect pests are not a signiﬁcant problem for small
scale organic farms (see, for instance, Powell, 2017). According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (undated), large
ﬁelds of the same crop are very attractive to certain insect
species that feed on those plants. As farmers attempt to
combat those pests by using chemical pesticides, the insects
‘respond’ by evolving resistance to the chemical agents,
which then motivates farmers to use more and different
types of chemical pesticides, which leads to further evolutionary resistance from the insects and so on.
Proponents of industrial agricultural practice contend that
it is the only way to meet the food need of growing population in low-income countries and ensure food security to
the poor of the global South (Montgomery, 2017). But those
sorts of claims must be treated with caution. In the 2016
United Nations Report to the General Assembly, Hilal Elver,
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the UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Food notes that
‘[p]overty, social exclusion, gender inequality, low socioeconomic status and lack of control over productive resources,
for example land-grabbing and seed patenting, are all major
contributors to malnutrition (including undernutrition (i.e.
lack of food experienced by the poor))’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 7). So, the problem is not inadequate
amount of food being grown, but access to food, which is
determined by a complex of socio-political-economic factors (Patel and Moore, 2018).
Whether the use of GE insects with gene drives in farming practice will result in increase in food production is not
known and it is not obvious that it will reduce hunger
among the poor. The environmental release of GE insects
with gene drives also poses ecological uncertainties and
risks. Moreover, the modiﬁed patented organisms present a
threat to the political autonomy of nations and indigenous
peoples as well as their sovereign right to their commons.
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Conclusion
Deliberations about the environmental release of GE animals
with gene drives must take into account the background
contexts and policy failures that motivate arguments that
present those GE organisms as ‘solutions’ to public health or
agricultural insect ‘pests’ problems. Nations must also recognize that by virtue of the ICESCR and the ICCPR, they have
an obligation to ensure that GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released without the substantive consent
of all nations and indigenous peoples that could be
affected. Moreover, countries must ensure that their citizens
and the NGOs, corporate entities, and other organizations
over whom they have jurisdiction do not act in ways that
deprive other nations and indigenous peoples of the opportunity to make informed, free decisions about the presence
of GE animals in their territories.
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Notes
1. The term ‘nations’ and ‘countries’ are used interchangeably; the former’s use does not denote an ethnically homogenous populace.
2. While all insect species are ‘located’ in the complex web of relationships between species in ecosystems, humans construe particular
species as ‘pests’ if they undermine their efforts to achieve particular ends (Courtier-Orgogozo et al., 2017).
3. The terms ‘genetically modiﬁed’ and ‘genetically engineered’ are
used interchangeably to denote organisms that have been manipulated in the laboratory by modern biotechnology methods such as
recombinant DNA technology or gene editing. Meganucleases, zinc
ﬁnger nuclease, transcription activator-like effector nucleases, and
the clustered regulatory interspersed short palindromic repeats
(CRISPR) associated system are gene editing techniques (Maeder
and Gersbach, 2016).
4. These problems are different than the ones that the Convention on
Biological Diversity’s Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and NagoyaKuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol address.
5. Or some other cas protein. See, for instance, Alphey, 2016; Burt and
Crisanti, 2018.
6. There are other ways of classifying gene drives, see, for instance,
Marshall and Akbari’s (2016) categorization of gene drives as
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17.

18.

19.

20.

threshold-dependent drives, threshold-independent drives, and temporally self-limiting drives. The different types of categorization
schemas for gene drives represent different ways of aggregating
them to serve particular purposes, be they heuristic or pragmatic
(such as making the use of the modiﬁed organisms acceptable to
the public).
What constitutes ‘sufﬁcient numbers’ would depend on the type of
gene drive that is used (see endnote 6).
HGT is the ‘transfer’ of genetic information to an unrelated organism; it stands in contrast to vertical gene transfer, which is transfer
of genetic material from parent to child.
See S€aterberg et al. (2013); Yoshida (2013) on functional extinction.
The 2016 NASEM report on gene drives considers the OX513A GE
mosquito to be on a continuum with mosquitoes under development that have gene drives that rely on newly developed genetic
editing techniques, such as a CRISPR/Cas9, for risk assessment purposes (p. 103).
See UN, The United Nations and Decolonization . . . for a list of nonself-governing and trust territories.
The idea of nationhood based on a shared ethnic identity was
rejected in the wake of WWII in part because it was the justiﬁcation
that was used by the Nazis to affect their morally repugnant and
vicious agenda of creating an ‘ethnically homogenous Germany’
(G€
umplova, 2018, p. 180). To foster peace and territorial re-conﬁgurations by the allies as well as de-colonization, ‘the right to self-determination was granted speciﬁcally to “colonised peoples”, who
were mostly multiethnic or multi-religious entities deﬁned essentially by their subjection to territorial domination by a foreign
colonising power. Territorial domination rather than substantive collective identity determined both boundaries and political identity.
These “peoples” became prominent holders of the right to self-determination which, moreover, was understood to be uniquely fulﬁlled by independence and sovereign statehood’ (G€
umplova, 2018,
p. 181).
It is unclear which international body would have the clout to seek
redress on their behalf.
The conception of substantive consent is derived from O’Neill’s
work (see, for instance, O’Neill, 2010).
This conception of the autonomy of indigenous peoples also draws
on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (especially Articles 19 and 32) (UN, 2007).
Coulthard (2014) argues that a colonial state that has deprived preexisting self-determining indigenous communities of their collective
rights and denied them their identity may only be willing to provide some of those peoples with some recognition as indigenous
peoples provided it is able to do so on terms that permit it to continue its domination and exploitation of them and their natural
resources
For a detailed, incisive critique of the colonial policy and practice of
affording ‘recognition’ to (certain) indigenous groups of some of
their rights to self-determination, see Coulthard, 2014.
It should be noted that scientiﬁc risk assessments have normative
assumptions embedded in them and they are shaped by normative
concerns; they are not value neutral (Meghani, 2017; Shrader-Frechette, 1991).
The rate at which the trait will spread is a function of the generation time of the species and a multitude of other variables, including the impact of the modiﬁcation on the ﬁtness of individuals as
well as evolutionary resistance to the trait.
Presumably, no democratic government has the authority to give
categorical rights over the natural resources of the country to a private entity. Patents are issued by federal governments and they
give the patent holder the right to determine the conditions under
which the patented object, process, trait or entity may be used by
others for commercial or research purposes; the right is time de-limited. Nations can and do place limits on the patent holder’s rights
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22.
23.

24.

for the sake of protecting public health or public order/welfare
(Malbon et al., 2014).
This would be true of gene drives that replace a ‘pest’ trait as well
as those that suppress the population of the wildtype of the species
for a limited number of generations and time. The former type of
gene drive would ensure a consistent revenue stream for the patent
holder as would the latter kind because, presumably, when its ‘effect’ wears off and the wildtype population bounces back, it would
be need to be used again and again.
While that is the intent whether it will be realized is not known
given the kinds and multitudes of uncertainty, including risks.
The call for all communities to be provided with a safe living environment, including clean water and sanitation facilities, and an end
to poverty and hunger are also expressed in the Indigenous Peoples Major Group 2015 policy brief on sustainable development.
The environmental risk may be present even if GE mosquitoes with
population replacement gene drives are used.
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